


Detecting Passive Content Leaks and Pollution in Android Applications


Yajin Zhou and Xuxian Jiang North Carolina State University








Apps Are Becoming Popular





Apps Are Managing User Data








Content Providers

Manage access to a structured set of data



By default are open to all apps on the phone (before Android 4.2)


Any potential security risks?




A Motivating Example

□ GO FBWidget: popular Android app with more than 1 million installs










A Motivating Example





A Motivating Example

Can be exploited to leak private data Access token, Facebook posts

Automatically log into user's Facebook account and make posts






Our Work

Systematically study two vulnerabilities: content leaks and content pollution

- 2.0% and 1.4% of apps are susceptible, respectively
- Types of information leaked
 - SMS messages, contacts, user credentials, ...
- Possible side-effects
 - Block SMS messages and phone calls
 - Download apps and prompt for installation



System Design






From public interfaces of content providers to functions that actually operate on internal database



Find Execution Paths

Function call graph
 Object reference resolution
 Call graph discontinuity





Generate Inputs


- Generate control flow graph
- Obtain constraints
- Resolve constraints



Generate Inputs

Android specific APIs

UriMatcher





- Feed generated inputs into a test app
- Invoke public interfaces of content providers
 query(), insert(), ...
- Determine the existence of vulnerabilities based on return value
 - query(): Cursor object
 insert(): URI object




- Around 6,500 SLOCs
- Public interfaces of content providers
 - u query(), openFile()
 - insert(), update()
- APIs that actually read or write internal database
 - SQLiteDatabase.query(), SQLiteDatabase.insert(),
 SQLiteQueryBuilder.query(), ...




Evaluation

- Dataset: 62,519 free apps
 - Sources: Google Play and ten other Android markets
 - □ Time: February 2012



Overall Results







Main Types of Leaked Data

Category	# of apps	Representative App	# of Installs
SMS messages	268	Pansi SMS	500,000 - 1,000,000
Contacts	128	mOffice – Outlook sync	100,000 — 500,000
Private information in IM Apps	121	Messenger With You	10,000,000 – 50,000,000
User credentials	80	GO FB Widget	1,000,000 - 5,000,000
Browser History	70	Dolphin Browser HD	10,000,000 - 50,000,000
Call logs	61	Droid Call Filter	100,000 - 500,000
Private information In social network apps	27	Sina Weibo	100,000 — 500,000





- Block SMS messages and phone calls: by manipulating security settings
 DW Contacts
- Download apps and prompt for installation
 Baidu Appsearch, Qihoo Browser









Vulnerable Security Apps

Mobile Security Personal Ed.

- Leak browser histories
- QQPimSecure, Anguanjia
 - Leak SMS, phone call logs
 Block SMS and phone calls
 - Ð







Possible Mitigations


- App Developers
 - Patch their vulnerable apps
- Platform provider (Google)
 - Change the default setting of content provider interface



- By Google: content providers are no longer exported by default on Android since 4.2
 - Developers need to explicitly change manifest file
 - Set targetSdkVersion to 17 (or higher)
 - Problems remain on old Android versions
 - The API level of 98.6% Android devices are less than 17 on February 04, 2013 [1]



Possible Mitigations



[1] http://developer.android.com/about/dashboards/index.html



Related Work

- Smartphone privacy
 - TaintDroid [Enck et al., OSDI 10], AdRisk [Grace et al., ACM WiSec 12] ...
- Confused deputy
 - Woodpecker [Grace et al., NDSS 12], Permission Re-Delegation [Felt et al., USENIX Security 11] ...
- Vulnerability detection
 - BitBlaze [Song et al., ICISS 08], KLEE [Cadar et al., USENIX Security 08] ...



Conclusion

- Systematically study two vulnerabilities: content leaks and content pollution
 - 2.0% and 1.4% of apps are susceptible, respectively
 - Types of information leaked
 - SMS messages, contacts, user credentials, ...
 - Possible side-effects:
 - Block SMS messages and phone calls, ...



Q&A

Yajin Zhou http://yajin.org (yajin_zhou@ncsu.edu)

